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A B S T R A C T   
This paper scrutinises how AI and robotic technologies are transforming the relationships between people and 
machines in new affective, embodied and relational ways. Through investigating what it means to exist as human 
‘in relation’ to AI across health and care contexts, we aim to make three main contributions. (1) We start by 
highlighting the complexities of philosophical issues surrounding the concepts of “artificial intelligence” and 
“ethical machines.” (2) We outline some potential challenges and opportunities that the creation of such tech-
nologies may bring in the health and care settings. We focus on AI applications that interface with health and 
care via examples where AI is explicitly designed as an ‘augmenting’ technology that can overcome human 
bodily and cognitive as well as socio-economic constraints. We focus on three dimensions of ‘intelligence’ - 
physical, interpretive, and emotional - using the examples of robotic surgery, digital pathology, and robot 
caregivers, respectively. Through investigating these areas, we interrogate the social context and implications of 
human-technology interaction in the interrelational sphere of care practice. (3) We argue, in conclusion, that 
there is a need for an interdisciplinary mode of theorising ‘intelligence’ as relational and affective in ways that 
can accommodate the fragmentation of both conceptual and material boundaries between human and AI, and 
human and machine. Our aim in investigating these sociological, philosophical and ethical questions is primarily 
to explore the relationship between affect, relationality and ‘intelligence,’ the intersection and integration of 
‘human’ and ‘artificial’ intelligence, through an examination of how AI is used across different dimensions of 
intelligence. This allows us to scrutinise how ‘intelligence’ is ultimately conveyed, understood and (technolog-
ically or algorithmically) configured in practice through emerging relationships that go beyond the conceptual 
divisions between humans and machines, and humans vis-à-vis artificial intelligence-based technologies.   
1. Introduction 
AI has the potential to be applied in almost all areas of health and 
care (Ramesh et al. 2004). Recent innovations in this field include 
AI-assisted robotic surgery, pattern recognition in diagnostic pathology, 
and assistive care robotics. Many of these applications require complex 
interface technologies and machine learning that can support relational 
human-AI interaction. While the interpretative, affective, and physical 
capacities these technologies exhibit can be described as ‘artificial in-
telligence,’ the conceptual boundaries of ‘intelligence’ as well as ‘arti-
ficiality’ remain disputed and open. Over the past decades, ‘intelligence’ 
has acquired an umbrella character encompassing multiple dimensions 
beyond abstract logical reasoning, including emotional and physical 
intelligence (Sternberg 2000). Concurrently, philosophical con-
ceptualisations around the extent and nature of ‘human’ vs ‘artificial’ 
cognitive capacities remain plural and contested (Robinson 2014). This 
contested conceptual landscape is evident in a recent report on AI that 
defines ‘intelligence’ broadly as “problem-solving,” and “artificially 
intelligent systems” as taking “the best possible action in a given situa-
tion,” leaving unresolved what intelligent “problem-solving” or “best 
possible action” might actually imply (Fenech et al., 2018: 9). What is 
clear, however, is that ‘emotional’ and ‘relational’ parameters of ‘in-
telligence’ must comprise a key component of artificial intelligence 
systems (Scheutz 2014). 
In this paper, we draw on interdisciplinary conceptual analysis 
combining our expertise in medical sociology and anthropology, 
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bioethics and philosophy to propose an interdisciplinary mode of the-
orising ‘intelligence’ in health and care contexts as relational and af-
fective, as a way of making sense of the fragmentation of both 
conceptual and material boundaries between humans and ‘intelligent,’ 
‘caring’ machines. We are particularly interested in exploring the ways 
in which AI and robotic technologies are generative of new forms of 
affective relationality including in the ways people give or receive 
health and social care in such technologically mediated contexts. In 
accord with Röttger-Rössler and Slaby (2018: 2), we understand affect 
not as processes “within” a person, but as social-relational dynamics 
unfolding in situated practices and social interaction. Our conceptual 
analysis draws on relevant scientific, social scientific and humanities 
literature, policy reports, and commissioning guidance on the develop-
ment of AI and robotic technologies in health and care. Particular 
attention was given to tracing the anticipatory discourse across these 
texts in order to investigate the implications of the promise of intelli-
gent, ethical, and affective machines across different health and care 
applications where different dimensions of intelligence (physical, 
interpretive and emotional) are embedded. We explore what this might 
mean for the web of human and non-human relationships in these 
settings. 
Based on this analysis, we first address conceptual complexities 
surrounding the concept of intelligence and its relationship to the 
human/machine boundary, ethics, affect and relationality. Second, we 
consider three different dimensions of intelligence, where the human 
and machine exist in a co-constitutive relationship; namely, physical, 
interpretive, and emotional, via the examples of robotic surgery, digital 
pathology, and care robotics. In so doing, we interrogate how current 
and anticipated developments in AI and robotics can enable us to think 
beyond reductive notions of intelligence and human-machine bound-
aries. Through an exploration of these different dimensions of intelli-
gence instantiated in different health and care contexts, we go on to 
argue that AI technologies and robotics not only re-materialise the 
boundaries of the human and the machine in affective and relational 
ways that challenge old distinctions and binaries between the artificial 
and natural, rational and emotional, and human and non-human, but 
they do so by augmenting and, indeed, changing human capabilities. 
We conclude that there is a time-critical need for an interdisciplinary 
approach to theorising intelligence, whether artificial or otherwise, as 
both relational and affective. Ultimately, we aim to contribute to such 
theorisation, through this contribution to understanding the relational 
and affective dimensions in human as well as machine intelligence 
across different sites of health and care. Indeed, as we show, AI and 
robotics - through surgery, diagnostics, and care - are already influ-
encing humans’ relationality, affects, and embodiment. Additionally, we 
hope that our research will inform policy and help those involved in AI, 
health and care to deal with some of the challenges unpacked in this 
paper. 
2. Conceptualising (artificial) intelligence 
2.1. Human VS machine 
AI has been described as “the science and engineering of making 
intelligent machines” McCarthy (2007: 2) or “the activity devoted to 
making machines intelligent” (Nilsson 2009: 13). Such definitions raise 
questions around what ‘intelligence’ itself entails. The word implies a 
philosophical and cultural fascination with intelligence as a character-
istic capacity that seemingly confers on humans a special place among 
other life forms. The notion of ‘artificial intelligence’ suggests that in-
telligence can be simulated through technological means, and yet that 
such simulated intelligence remains different from the ‘natural’ or, 
perhaps, ‘real’ intelligence exhibited by humans. The meaning of intel-
ligence and how it should be defined and measured in practice remains 
significantly contested. Although Fenech et al. (2018) define intelli-
gence in terms of problem-solving, multiple alternative definitions exist 
that range from logical or abstract to practical reasoning: for instance, 
the capacity to learn from experience or to adapt to new situations to 
achieve one’s goals in the confines of one’s sociocultural context (Legg 
and Hutter 2007). Correspondingly, definitions of artificial intelligence 
are plural in ways that reflect the underlying conceptual ambiguity 
around intelligence in general. Such conceptual ambiguity within and 
between artificial and human intelligence leads us, not to seek a stable 
definition, but to examine the interrelatedness of human and 
non-human dimensions of intelligence, their permeable boundaries and 
the possibilities of ‘posthuman’ (artificial) intelligence. 
Given the complexity of human intelligence in all its facets, theories 
of intelligence have moved away from models based on abstract 
reasoning and logic (alone), towards more complex and nuanced 
frameworks that encompass multiple attributes and dimensions of 
(human) abilities. For instance, Gardner’s (1993) multiple intelligences 
theory incorporates inter- and intrapersonal bodily kinaesthetic, spatial, 
linguistic and musical dimensions in addition to the 
logical-mathematical dimension into a plural framework of intelligence. 
Increasing amounts of research have been devoted to understanding the 
forms of intelligence required for social interactions and relationships, 
and the emotional intelligence concept especially has been popularised 
in both public and academic contexts (Monnier 2015). Yet, as with the 
theory of intelligence in general, there is no commonly agreed definition 
over the meaning and scope of these multiple forms of intelligence. 
While computers today are superior to humans in chess and exhibit far 
greater intelligence in terms of computation power and ability to process 
large quantities of information at high speed, mapping more nuanced 
notions of intelligence like emotional or inter-personal aptitudes into 
artificial systems remains a notable challenge. 
Nowadays, the focus of posthuman thought is on shifting away from 
the humanistic paradigm, deconstructing the notion of human unique-
ness including in terms of emotional capabilities, and leading towards 
the future creation of machines that feel, and initiate feelings in return 
(Braidotti 2019). Posthuman prospects envision possibilities where 
emotional capacity in AI technologies and robotics no longer separates 
humans and machines. Indeed, transformations of affective embodiment 
and material experiences in AI technologies and robotics are already 
shaping the present and future of health and care, as we show in sub-
sequent sections. 
2.2. ‘Caring’ AI 
The conceptual ambiguities around (human vs machine) intelligence 
bear directly upon questions around the integration of social and af-
fective dimensions into ‘artificial’ systems, which has been a significant 
part of innovation in AI (Wilson, 2009). Social computing focuses on 
the use of computational devices to facilitate social interactions among 
users (e.g. social media), whereas, affective computing draws on an 
interdisciplinary interest in the non-verbal, often trans-subjective and, 
at times, non-conscious dimensions of embodied experiences and forms 
of knowing including feeling, sensation, attention, and listening 
(Blackman and Venn 2010). Pioneered in the early ‘90s by Rosalind 
Picard, the turn to affect in AI research now branches into wearable 
computing, big data, psychology, neuroscience, and modelling in order 
to advance the knowledge, understanding, and development of systems 
for sensing, recognising, categorising, and reacting to human emotion 
(Lee and Norman 2016). 
Picard (1997: 250) and her team at MIT Media Lab have called for “a 
change in computing” and “rethinking how computers function,” rec-
ognising that affect is “integral to human intelligent functioning” and 
“not a separate process from cognition” but rather “inextricably inter-
twined with it.” The intersection of AI and affective computing has 
particular relevance for health and care innovation, where a movement 
is growing towards more ‘relationship-centered’ and ‘compassionate’ 
service delivery models (Beach and Thomas 2006; DoH 2009; NHS 
2012). These models emphasise the importance of relationships, 
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including the centrality of affect, emotional connection, reciprocity, and 
their moral as well as therapeutic value in the context of care delivery, 
where the nature and quality of care relationships influence outcomes 
(Dewar and Nolan 2013). 
The notion of affect refers broadly to states of being rather than how 
they manifest, or are interpreted as emotions like anger, happiness, 
disgust, or fear (Hemmings 2005). Affect is related to but distinct from 
emotions, and refers to forms of knowledge that entail social interpre-
tation, embodied experiences, and knowings that emerge in relation to 
other human beings and objects in the world. As such, affect is 
social-relational (Röttger-Rössler and Slaby 2018) and generated in so-
cial contexts through interaction with other people and objects, but in 
ways also linked with social norms and power relations. AI technologies 
in health and care are a particularly fruitful example for exploring 
relational and affective human-technology interfaces. As AI applications 
are increasingly investigated and implemented into care provision, re-
searchers need to scrutinise critically the implications of 
human-technology interaction in health and care practice. This is 
especially the case given that critical analyses of computational algo-
rithms have shown AI applications to be value-laden and configured in 
ways that privilege some values over others (Mittelstadt et al. 2016) an 
may reflect the power relationships within the health and care settings 
where they are applied. In the context of care delivery, machine learning 
introduces increasing complexity by bringing uncertainty to algorithmic 
decision-making, including about how and what kind of care is provided 
for different recipients. The intersection of these phenomena opens up a 
critical space for exploring the empirical, conceptual, and normative 
foundations and implications of the affective relationality of AI health 
and care innovations. Furthermore, it raises questions about the rela-
tionship between ‘artificiality’ and ‘affectivity,’ and ‘human’ and ‘ma-
chine’ intelligence, and about what it might mean relationally to be a 
care recipient, care provider, or indeed ‘human’ in AI-mediated re-
lationships and spaces in respect to health and care. 
2.3. ‘Ethical’ machines 
AI also raises the possibility of ‘ethical machines,’ that could be 
conceived as subjects, rather than objects. These would be ethical agents 
responsible for their actions, or “autonomous moral agents” (van 
Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019). In this paper, we use the term ‘ma-
chines’ in a broad sense to include semi-autonomous and autonomous 
robots as well as purely algorithmic systems making decisions. Some 
refer to such machines as “artificial moral agents” (Allen et al. 2009) 
which are supposedly capable of moral decision making (Anderson 
et al. 2006) and thus have an “ethical dimension” (Crnkovic et al. 
2012). For Moor (2006), a machine counts as a “full ethical agent” if it 
is comparable to human moral decision makers. Cave et al. (2018:2) 
prefer referring to ‘ethically aligned machines,’ machines that “function 
in a way which is ethically desirable, or at least ethically acceptable” and 
that are capable of “ethical reasoning.” Yet a wide conceptual gulf re-
mains between machines that simply do what is ethical, and the possi-
bility of genuine artificial moral agency. 
In the discussion about reasoning machines, it is commonly agreed 
that a standard account of agency requires the capacity for intentional 
actions. A robot that is incapable of acting unethically, that merely ex-
ecutes an algorithm, without the capacity for choice and intention, 
cannot be said to be an agent in this sense. Yet, if we take a relational 
approach to understanding (artificial) intelligence, the location of 
agency itself changes to something achieved through interaction. A 
robot that is programmed to follow ethical rules can very easily be 
modified, through human intervention, to follow unethical rules (Van-
derelst and Winfield 2018). As with intelligence, the very concept of 
what is ethical, as well as what it is to act ethically, is contested and often 
context-dependent, again demanding a relational, and as we go on to 
argue, an inter/transdisciplinary approach. 
The kind of ‘strong’ or ‘super’ AIs that might have the capacity for 
genuine moral agency remain the purview of science fiction (Bostrom 
2003). AI technologies in their present state might be more accurately 
conceptualised as a form of ‘human augmentation,’ increasing human 
productivity, capability, or adding to the human body or mind in some 
way, including through augmented sensing, cognition, and action 
(Raisamo et al. 2019). Even as such, they will nonetheless function as 
‘ethical machines’ in the relational sense. What is of interest, therefore, 
is not the ‘ethical machine’ in isolation and whether AIs may have the 
capacity for ethical reasoning in themselves, but the ‘ethical 
human-machine system’. AI technologies, as they augment human ca-
pacities, also embed and respond to the interests and values of stake-
holders in a given socio-political context, together with the humans that 
build, interact with, care for and are cared for by them. 
AI and robotic applications in the health and care sectors raise a 
number of ethical challenges including: potential privacy issues; con-
cerns over liberty and dignity of those receiving care (Sparrow and 
Sparrow 2006; Sharkey and Sharkey 2011; Sharkey 2014); the 
consequences, both for caregivers and recipients, of replacing human 
interaction and human caregiving labour with machine substitutes 
(Decker 2008; Stanford University 2016); how to deal with error and 
responsibility concerning machine decisions and actions (Matthias 
2004; Sparrow 2007); how to build trust between machines, patients, 
and medical professionals; and, especially, their potential to re-enforce 
social inequalities (Vallverdú and Casacuberta 2015). Moreover, as 
engineers’ views of knowledge affect the way they shape such knowl-
edge in the machines - building a knowledge-based system necessarily 
involves selection and interpretation (Forsythe 1993) - this process 
opens up possibilities to develop bias, through for instance replicating 
social stereotypes. One example is the association of femininity with 
assistive technologies (e.g. Siri, Alexa, Cortana), which sustains ideas of 
feminine docile labour and replaceable embodiment (Sutko 2019). We 
now go on to reflect on some of these challenges, and how an approach 
to theorising ethical human-machine systems as relational and affective 
can offer insights to begin to address them. The three dimensions of 
intelligence that we discuss below – physical, interpretive, and affective 
- are a heuristic that we use to explore affect and relationality as AI and 
robotics enter the world of health and care. 
3. Three dimensions of ‘intelligence’  
1. Physical Intelligence: Robotic Surgery 
Robotics integrates information technology and physical embodi-
ment: robots not only inhabit the physical space, but often also physi-
cally interact with humans (Thrun 2004). The use of increasingly 
sophisticated algorithms in robotics can facilitate deeper and more 
complex human-machine relationships with physical dimensions. Ro-
botic surgery, in particular, is a rapidly advancing field primarily aimed 
at extending human capabilities and overcoming human limitations to 
improve task performances in surgery (Camarillo et al. 2004). Different 
levels of robotic involvement may be classified broadly into three de-
grees of autonomy: the passive role, where the robot’s involvement is 
limited in scope; the restricted-active role, where the robot takes more 
invasive tasks, but is still not actively involved in the essential portions 
of the procedure; and the active role, where the robot is “intimately 
involved in the procedure and carries high responsibility and risk” (ibid.: 
4S). Even robots that perform an active role, however, have limited 
capacity for autonomous action. Rather than replacing human surgeons, 
these machines generally require significant human supervision and 
interaction, which means that robotic surgery today is more accurately 
described as ‘robot-assisted’ surgery. 
An example of an active-role surgical robot is the daVinci® Surgical 
System, a tele-operated system where a human surgeon controls the 
motion of the robot via a remote console (Intuitive Surgical 2019). The 
surgeon is connected to the robot via a highly magnified, high definition 
visual display and control handles that establish a haptic interface 
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between the surgeon and the robot. The control algorithms of the system 
translate the surgeon’s hand movements into the same movements by 
the robot’s surgical instruments, at the same time as the surgeon can 
receive sensation of pressure and force from the instruments through the 
haptic feedback. While the daVinci® robot has a low level of autonomy, 
the robot is engaged in direct and sustained physical contact with the 
patient’s tissues throughout the procedure, giving it an active role 
within the surgical process (Camarillo et al. 2004). The sustained 
physical contact it has with the patient also means that human-robot 
relationality is established between the robot and the patient, and be-
tween the human surgeon and the human patient via the robot as a 
‘physical mediator.’ Through the haptic interface, the robot’s actions are 
intertwined with both the surgeon’s and the patient’s body. The robot 
thus becomes intimately integrated within the surgeon-patient interac-
tion in material ways that re-make the relationship between the surgeon 
and the patient, as the boundaries of the human body and the machine 
become entangled. Machines such as the daVinci® system establish a 
mutuality where the surgeon’s accuracy is potentially augmented 
through the robot, at the same time as the robot relies on the surgeon’s 
embodied knowledge and actions. 
Robotic surgery has the potential to facilitate microscale surgical 
interventions that are extremely challenging or impossible for human 
surgeons to perform without sophisticated robotic mediation due to the 
physical size, limited motion control, and dexterity of the human hand 
(Camarillo et al. 2004). Clinical areas where microsurgical robots are 
anticipated include foetal surgery, ophthalmology, laryngology, and 
otology, with most existing microsurgery robot prototypes having been 
developed for these areas. An example of prototype microsurgical robots 
is a device created by a multidisciplinary research team in Italy, which 
aims to overcome human limitations in performing laser 
phono-micro-surgery (a challenging surgical procedure to correct vocal 
cord abnormalities using a surgical laser beam) (Mattos et al., 2016). 
The device is a robot-assisted laser micromanipulator that eliminates the 
need for manual control of the laser beam, replacing it with a virtual 
surgeon-robot interface system; the surgeon can control the laser beam 
via a touchscreen tablet computer, which provides magnified live videos 
of the surgical area and assistive functions like real-time feedback on the 
laser incision depth, by using a stylus pen that functions as a ‘virtual 
scalpel’ (ibid.). The robot-assisted system can significantly enhance 
precision, safety, efficacy and quality of microsurgery by augmenting 
the actuation and sensing capacities of the surgeon. 
We can think of these robots in terms of ‘physical intelligence,’ going 
beyond reasoning-centric definitions of intelligence in conceptualising 
AI. Robot-assisted surgical systems such as those described above are re- 
making and re-defining the boundaries of human embodiment and 
physical capability within the surgical context. As such, robotic surgery 
can be seen to represent the extension of human physical intelligence via 
augmented accuracy, dexterity and precision, and extended field of 
vision provided by machines. The integration of robotic systems within 
surgical teams also implies a breaking down of clear embodied bound-
aries and sensations between the human and the robot, as the robot 
extends the surgeon’s body and physical skills ‘artificially’ while relying 
on the surgeon to function in the first place. 
Robot-assisted surgery thus reconstitutes both the physical and 
embodied scope of the surgeon’s intelligence and the physical relations 
of the surgical encounter. This demands further scrutiny of the physical, 
relational and affective implications of integrating ‘robot surgeons’ into 
surgical teams, including in terms of what this means for how the 
boundaries of the human body are being re-made. The human-machine 
network extends the body with instruments, modulating the user’s 
movements, knowledge, and affects (Mühlhoff, 2019). This leads to a 
reciprocal co-dependence of users and AI, which is at the core of specific 
forms of mechanised power and control in human-aided AI. Thus, it 
becomes important to interrogate the relational dynamics through 
which users associate with these technologies and, in turn, relate to 
themselves and others (Guzman and Lewis 2019). Such process may 
impact the surgeons’ and patients’ embodied experiences, while trans-
forming notions of trust, liability, accountability, relationality, and af-
fects. This then raises questions about the implications of robot 
surgeons’ embodiment for ethics and law, including for instance who is 
held accountable if something goes wrong.  
2. Interpretive Intelligence: Digital Pathology 
In pathology, machine learning algorithms are being developed 
especially for digital image analysis to assist in diagnosis (Tizhoosh and 
Pantanowitz 2018). Over the past two decades, this process has been 
facilitated by the creation of faster digital networks, cheaper data stor-
age and sharing solutions, and advances in image processing, pattern 
recognition algorithms, and machine learning (Salto-Tellez et al. 
2018), along with development and widespread use of ‘digital slides’ 
(Al-Janabi et al. 2012). These technologies have the potential to extend 
the frontiers of pathology and enable the utilisation and integration of 
knowledge beyond human limitations (Niazi et al. 2019). This is 
especially so when image analysis can be combined with other kinds of 
integrated data from different sources such as electronic patient records 
and ‘-omics’ data (Holzinger et al., 2017), as shown by recent studies 
on the success rates of Google Health breast cancer screening (McKin-
ney et al. 2020). However, to learn how to diagnose a disease reliably 
and effectively, the algorithms still require large sets of high-quality 
training images annotated by human pathologists and programmers 
beforehand. As in robotic surgery, there are different levels of algo-
rithmic involvement in pathology, and even machine learning algo-
rithms with the highest levels of autonomy have limited capacity to 
work independently (Holzinger et al. 2017). The application of ma-
chine learning algorithms in pathology can most accurately be described 
as ‘machine-aided’ or ‘computer-assisted’ pathology that is facilitating 
the emergence of algorithmically ‘augmented pathologists’ (Tizhoosh 
and Pantanowitz, 2018). 
The dependence on data collected by human surgeons or clinicians 
means that these algorithms remain inescapably value-laden, as their 
operational parameters have been specified by the developers and then 
configured for use by others with specific desired outcomes in mind that 
prioritise some interests over others (Martin 2018). These algorithms 
can, at best, ‘objectively’ implement the programmers’ and annotators’ 
pre-existing decision patterns (Tadrious, 2010). However, the outputs 
that algorithms produce can never exceed the inputs, which means that 
the decisions algorithms make are always only as reliable (or ‘neutral’) 
as the data they are based on. Research shows that flaws in the under-
lying data, especially gender and racial bias, are inadvertently adopted 
by algorithms. For instance, Buolamwini and Gebru (2019) have 
raised concerns about the efficiency of automated facial analysis algo-
rithms and databases with respect to phenotypic subgroups. They found 
that in the U.S. such datasets are overwhelmingly composed of 
lighter-skinned subjects, with rates of up to 86.2%, and that 
darker-skinned females are the most misclassified group, with error 
rates of up to 34.7% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2019: 77). The maximum 
error rate for lighter-skinned males was instead 0.8%. Studies like these 
raise urgent ethical questions around how (and whether it is possible) to 
build fair, transparent, and accountable analysis algorithms. More 
generally, training data sets may set in a range of biases, not necessarily 
racial or gendered, which will shape practices in ways that are neither 
obvious nor transparent. 
The above also raises questions about the ways in which racialised 
affects and especially the unconscious dimensions of affective responses 
to racial (and other socially significant) differences exhibited by humans 
become embedded within and reinforced via algorithms. Indeed, as 
Al-Saji (2014) among others has argued, racialisation, while often 
remaining an unconscious process, takes hold of bodies by means of 
perception. Individuals project ‘race’ as a property upon a body 
including by naturalising features like skin colour, facial attributes, etc. 
as racial features. In the case of image processing, pattern recognition 
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algorithms, and machine learning, questions around fairness, trans-
parency and accountability thus stretch beyond more constrained 
framings of ‘bias.’ They encompass wider social, cultural and structural 
forces that shape how humans perceive and categorise difference and 
response to difference in affective terms. Algorithms will inevitably 
inherit these perceptions and categorisations and, in doing so, are likely 
to incite affective responses to them, potentially influencing human 
responses based on racial biases. 
It is also important to investigate how the human interpretation of 
pathologists increasingly relying on digital images co-analysed by al-
gorithms is substantially changing how disease is interpreted and con-
ceptualised as well as the responses to it. Moreover, there is currently no 
established way to explain why machine learning algorithms make a 
particular decision when interpreting digital slide images. This is a 
manifestation of the wider ‘black box’ problem that pertains to most 
contexts where these algorithms are employed (Burrell 2016). This is 
especially problematic in medicine where a reliable diagnosis should be 
transparent and fully comprehensible, while the pathologists and other 
human practitioners involved need to justify reasons for reaching 
particular medical decisions (Tizhoosh and Pantanowitz, 2018). The 
result is that it is not straightforward to identify who should be held 
responsible and accountable for diagnostic errors. 
The relationship between human subjectivity, affect, and algorithmic 
design works both ways: algorithms can also change how humans 
conceptualise, perceive or (affectively) respond to the world, for 
example by producing new categories of illness and disease from the 
data through identifying novel patterns of malignancy or correlations 
between population sub-groups and types of disease. In the words of 
Mittlestandt et al. (2016: 5), “algorithmic activities, like profiling, 
re-ontologise the world by understanding and conceptualising it in new, 
unexpected ways, and triggering and motivating actions based on the 
insights it generates.” This has important implications for medicine in 
terms of how patients and illnesses are categorised and treated, 
including when new or emerging categories of illness or disease sus-
ceptibility align with pre-existing socially meaningful categories like 
race or gender. It will also change both pathologists’ and patients’ ex-
periences of healthcare provision in embodied, relational, and affective 
terms. Firstly, digital pathology is changing what has conventionally 
been largely a qualitative assessment of tissue samples by a human 
pathologist into an increasingly quantitative assessment co-performed 
by algorithms. This is likely to change the pathologists’ embodied 
perception of diagnostics, not only due to the digitisation of pathology 
workflows but also due to the consequent loss of contact with the ma-
teriality of the human tissue on the part of the pathologist. 
Secondly, the relationships (including of trust) that patients have 
with human physicians will be conditioned by algorithms as central 
actors in the making of their diagnoses, while the shift from traditional 
pathology and patient care to digital pathology will require technolog-
ical solutions that pull information from a wide range of disparate 
medical databases. The convergence of advanced imaging, automation, 
and powerful analytics like natural language processing and machine 
learning, are bringing together the tools needed for scientists and cli-
nicians to make medical breakthroughs at an unprecedented pace. It is 
thus crucial to analyse how these technologies are transforming prac-
tices of health and care and to critically interrogate the meaning and 
nature of ‘fair,’ ‘inclusive,’ ‘transparent’ and ‘accountable’ analysis al-
gorithms. Thus, concerns that have been raised around fairness, trans-
parency, bias and accountability with respect to algorithmic medicine 
must also be read with an understanding of how the shift to digital pa-
thology alters the relational aspects of health and care practices. This 
includes questions around how algorithms embed and may reinforce 
socially and culturally conditioned ‘habits of seeing’ and processes of 
categorisation and interpretation that have the potential to reinforce 
existing social frameworks of difference and ‘otherness’ as well as to 
enable medical advances.  
3. Emotional Intelligence: Socially Assistive Robots 
Robotics in the delivery of care is expected to flourish in the face of 
shortages of healthcare personnel, ageing populations, and calls for 
improved quality of care. Developments in AI in combination with as-
sistive physical technologies are currently facilitating the production of 
Socially Assistive Robots (SARs). These emotionally perceptive or 
intelligent machines represent a new site of affective relationality in 
care, designed to interact with humans via a communicative range that 
includes ‘emotional’ responses (Ziemke, 2001). These responses 
include interaction, communication, companionship, and emotional 
attachment (Kolling et al., 2016). The potential of robot carers has 
taken on new significance in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as a 
way of mitigating the risks to public and individual health caused by 
human contact (Forman et al. 2020). However, the emergence of SARs 
also raises new ethical and social as well as technological questions, 
including about the ways in which emotionality and sociability should 
be and are being algorithmically configured and how care recipients 
might perceive and respond to such algorithmic sociability. It is still 
unclear how the perceived role and value of human relationships might 
influence the development of SARs, and how these technologies may, in 
turn, influence the nature of existing relationships between humans. 
Furthermore, there are likely to be cross-cultural differences in the an-
swers that are given to these questions. For instance, in Japan - which is 
the leading country in the production of SARs - the emergence of social 
robotics has already become a site of intense affective and psychological 
investment, and the attribution of ‘heart/mind’ (kokoro) to robots is a 
common phenomenon (Katsuno, 2011). In the Japanese context, 
Sugano (1997: 21) argues that to make robots “truly useful for humans, 
it is ideal to establish a ‘heart-to-heart relationship’ (kokoro no fureai), 
which enables both the human and the robot to understand each other 
like human beings. In this light, the robot needs its own heart.” 
Sugano identifies three types of robot kokoro, which pertain to 
different aspects of the human-robot affective relationship: the robot 
that affects human kokoro; the robot that can understand human kokoro; 
and the robot with its own kokoro. The first category of robots capable of 
affecting human kokoro encompasses companion and therapeutic ro-
bots, often modelled in the shape of animals, that are designed to affect 
the mental and emotional states of humans. Examples include the Sony® 
AIBO, a series of commercial dog companion robots (Sony 2019); and 
the AIST Paro, a soft baby seal robot designed for use in hospitals and 
nursing homes as a therapeutic tool (IEEE 2019). The second category 
maps onto what Turkle (2007) has described as ‘relational artefacts:’ 
sociable machines equipped with computational systems designed to 
create a conduit for emotional ‘touch’ with humans by being capable of 
actively facilitating reciprocal communication. The majority of 
contemporary research aiming to develop humanoid robots focuses on 
this type of intelligent and caring machines. Sugano’s third category, 
robots that have their own kokoro or their own emotional responses and 
affective states, remains confined to science fiction as it pertains to 
‘super intelligence.’ Nonetheless, emotionally intelligent robots are 
indubitably present as sociotechnical imaginaries in academic discourse 
as well as popular culture particularly in Japan. 
Kim and Kim (2012) assert that ‘culture’ is an important factor to 
consider when evaluating an individual’s emotional attitudes toward 
robots, because it affects people’s beliefs, and behaviours. Drawing on 
cross-cultural comparative research, Kim and Kim observe that bonding 
with inanimate objects and cohabiting with a ‘friendly robot’ appear to 
be deeply embedded particularly in the ‘Japanese culture.’ Šabanović 
(2014), however, points out that the widespread social acceptability of 
robots in Japan is the result of technical discourse and practices of ro-
botics researchers, who for decades have adapted their designs to public 
taste to promote social acceptance of their work. As documented by 
Katsuno (2011: 102), while robot builders in Japan “describe the early 
development of their robots as alter egos, they also notice that […] 
public expectations of the robot also play a role in the process of ‘raising’ 
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their robots.” Moreover, since the 1950s, popular culture in Japan has 
contributed to forming the image of a friendly robot through famous 
iconic animation characters such as ‘Tetsuwan Atom’ and ‘Doraemon.’ 
Hornyak (2006) documents that the Japanese engineers building 
‘friendly robots’ had these characters as models in their mind. The 
specificity of the Japanese socio-historical context demonstrates the 
need to develop new conceptual tools informed by social analysis to 
engage with the “contradictions that robot-human relations evoke” in 
humans (Shaw-Garlock, 2009: 258). 
Wilson (2010) suggests that our understanding of what constitutes 
an artificial intelligence and an intelligent machine is deeply inflected 
by fantasy, performance, and emotion. Experiments have demonstrated 
that people project life-like attributes onto robots to impute traces of 
empathy in the machines (Darling et al. 2015: 770). In particular, 
research shows that humans ascribe agency to some robots and treat 
them as social actors (Darling 2017). For instance, Riek et al. (2009) 
carried out an experiment in the U.S. where human participants were 
shown videos of robots with increasing anthropomorphic attributes 
being mistreated by humans. The participants were asked to share their 
feelings about these videos, to say how sorry they felt for each kind of 
robot and which ones they would like to save in case of an earthquake. 
Most of the participants chose the humanoid robots over 
non-anthropomorphic machines, suggesting that anthropomorphism 
plays and important role in soliciting empathy towards robots. 
In fact, human communication and interaction make significant use 
of complex non-verbal gestures such as facial expressions, hand and 
body movements, which support the perception of connectedness be-
tween the human communicators (Sidner et al., 2005). While designing 
human likeness including non-verbal gesturing into robots may be sig-
nificant for the creation of trust and ability to bond with robots, Mori’s 
(1970) ‘uncanny valley’ hypothesis also suggests that there is a certain 
threshold beyond which the human-like appearance of a robot may repel 
rather than attract humans. Eventually, how people emotionally and 
behaviourally respond to ‘human like’ robots remains unpredictable 
(Woods et at. 2004). As discussed, in Japan socially embedded design 
and popular culture facilitated the public acceptance of humanised ro-
bots. Conversely, ‘Western’ popular culture in particular may have 
created a more negative image of humanoid robots, through science 
fiction novels and films like ‘I, Robot’ and ‘The Terminator.’ 
It is important to consider how robotising social spaces might induce 
new socio-material ontologies that entangle human and machine so-
ciability and affectivity; and the ways in which scholarly descriptions of 
the emerging socio-material collectives may ‘forget’ or prioritise some 
aspects of human personhood at the expense of others (Jones 2017). 
The emergence and development of SARs have the potential to re-define 
how health and social care is provided, both in relational and affective as 
well as socio-economic terms. Moreover, building sociable robots could 
allow to gain a scientific understanding of social intelligence and human 
sociality (Breazeal, 2002: 6). Making socially and emotionally intelli-
gent machines requires a model of social and emotional intelligence that 
can be configured algorithmically, but the models that are chosen for 
such configuration will inevitably be shaped by social and cultural no-
tions of what these forms of intelligence look like. SARs are not only 
designed to trigger human emotions, but the incorporation of such ro-
botic entities into the realm of social life invariably alters the conditions 
and dynamics of human interaction; this gives rise to a social context 
where humans co-mingle and live ‘in relation’ with intelligent and 
caring machines (Shanyang, 2006). While it remains uncertain whether 
computing itself can be ‘affective,’ and what it means for it to be so 
(Hollnagel, 2003), it is crucial to attend to affective dimensions of AI 
and ethical systems into which they will be integrated, and to scrutinise 
the consequences of this for reconfigurations of human and machine 
relationships across all dimensions of (artificial) intelligence and sites of 
application. 
4. Conclusion 
The potential for both AI and robotics in health and social care is 
vast, as these technologies are increasingly a part of our healthcare eco- 
system, actively transforming the relationship between humans and 
machines in new affective, embodied, and relational ways. In digital 
pathology, AI is already being successfully used to detect diseases more 
accurately and in earlier stages, enabling pathologists and other 
healthcare providers to better diagnose, monitor and treat potentially 
life-threatening conditions. Combined with AI technologies, robots are 
also increasingly being used in healthcare, ranging from simple labo-
ratory robots to highly complex surgical robots, which can aid a human 
surgeon to execute complex operations. In addition to surgery, robots 
are increasingly used in hospitals and care settings including in reha-
bilitation, physical therapy and in support of those with long-term 
conditions such as dementia. Social robots have the potential to revo-
lutionise, in particular but not exclusively, the care for ageing pop-
ulations helping people to remain independent for longer, reducing the 
need for hospitalisation and care homes. By exploring these different 
contexts and the range of intelligence therein, we have begun to show 
how affective and relational dimensions are being constituted in the 
development and application of these new modes of health and social 
care. Understanding what ‘intelligence’ means beyond the conceptual 
human-machine division allows further understanding of how AI func-
tions as an ‘augmenting’ technology that is moving beyond human 
bodily, cognitive, and spatial constraints. In this paper, we also began to 
explore how the ‘intelligent’, ’caring’ and ‘relational’ capacities of AI 
influence the way in which such ethical systems function, and what the 
consequences and ethical implications of these relational processes 
might be. 
Highlighting the affective and relational dimensions of AI in health 
and social care contexts we focused on how three different dimensions of 
intelligence are conveyed, understood, and configured in and through 
technological innovation. Our analysis begins to suggest what this 
means for contemporary health and care practices. In so doing, we have 
examined how current and anticipated innovations around AI technol-
ogies and robotics might be shaping health and social care provision. 
This simultaneously impacts on the nature of care relationships, and on 
the nature of the capabilities and ‘intelligences’ that are and can be 
embodied by human care providers and medical professionals in inter-
action with these non-human presences. We argue that the current and 
anticipated near future developments in AI can most accurately be 
described as ‘human augmentation’ and that such a focus foregrounds 
the interactional entanglements that do and will shape intelligence, 
affect and relationships in and across different health and care contexts. 
By considering robotic surgery, machine learning algorithms in 
digital pathology, and care robotics as augmenting technologies that aim 
to extend human capacities and overcome limitations, we have explored 
how the boundaries of the human body, interpretive abilities, resource 
constraints, and affective relational connections are being made and 
remade through the human-machine interaction. These phenomena 
demonstrate how the current context of AI innovations in care is less 
about modelling the multidimensional nature of ‘human intelligence’ 
into an artificial system, and more about co-constitutive processes 
through which the boundaries of the human and the machine are being 
re-configured in relation to each other. Such re-configuration is taking 
place in ways that are moving beyond reductive conceptual divisions 
between humans and machines, and human and artificial intelligence. 
As Seyfert (2018) identifies, in a different AI context (high frequency 
trading), ‘users’ of such technologies become components of the system, 
developing bonds between humans and machines. Our three exemplars 
demonstrate that embodied relationship – whether this is the surgeon’s 
augmented dexterity, the pathologist’s interpretive reach or the care 
receiver’s social connectedness - and underlies our argument that we 
need to garner interdisciplinary conceptual apparatus to understand the 
co-constitutive dynamics of developments in (artificial) intelligence. 
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Intelligent and caring machines are transforming the mental and 
physical scope of human health and care providers and recipients, 
entailing the emergence of new kinds of affective relationships and 
connections between humans and machines. However, the manifesta-
tions and implications of this process currently remain uncertain and in- 
depth, empirical research needs to be developed alongside more abstract 
argument about what is or should happen. As non-human AI and robotic 
actors are increasingly integrated into healthcare teams and relation-
ships, they also give rise to new social and ethical challenges regarding 
the possible effects that these technologies may have on the quality and 
efficacy of care, while raising crucial questions of accountability and 
responsibility over errors and malpractice. Without developing detailed 
understanding of the fundamental transformations in (artificial) intel-
ligence in practice, where humans and machines form the new eco- 
system of health and care, we will not be able to ascertain what is lost 
and gained, by and for whom, or therefore to exercise agency in crafting 
our future relationships of health and care in transparent and equitable 
ways. 
The use of these technologies also pertains to the ways in which 
different kinds of capabilities, skills and forms of ‘intelligence’ are being 
modelled into human-interfacing AI and robotic systems. These timely 
questions can only be addressed through an interdisciplinary mode of 
research and scholarship that can accommodate the fragmentation of 
conceptual as well as material boundaries between humans and tech-
nology, and between ‘human’ and ‘artificial’ intelligence, and the con-
sequences of this for practices of health and care. There is thus a need for 
further development of the conceptual, normative, and ethical tools that 
are used to understand and evaluate both AI-driven technologies and the 
changes they are making in the expression and manifestations of the 
affective and relational aspects of human experience. Through this 
paper, we hope to have contributed towards this effort by examining 
how ‘intelligence,’ in its different dimensions, is being manifested and 
co-constituted through the human-technology interface, in ways that are 
re-materialising the boundaries of the human and the machine identities 
in affective, embodied, and relational ways. We enjoin further explo-
ration of AI and robotics in health and social care that centres how in-
telligence is being understood and created, the affective and relational 
practices that develop in different contexts, and the implications of this 
for our health and care practices. 
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